





The Effect of Far Right Parties on the Location Choice of 
 

















advantage	 for	 parties	 with	 anti‐immigration	 or	 nationalist	 platforms.	 This	 paper	 explores	 a	 closely	 related	 but	
overlooked	issue:	how	immigrant	behaviour	is	influenced	by	these	parties.	We	focus	on	immigrant	location	decisions	in	
Northern	 Italy,	an	area	 that	has	 seen	 the	 rise	 of	 the	anti‐immigration	party	Lega	Nord.	We	 construct	a	dataset	 of	
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Immigration, and immigration policy, has increasingly taken centre stage in the global political 
landscape. This has manifested itself in a number of ways. Both the recent UK referendum on 
membership of the EU (so-called Brexit), and the Trump 2016 presidential campaign were 
punctuated by a range of inflammatory statements regarding immigration. Examples range from the 
then leader of UKIP Nigel Farage’s infamous “Breaking Point” poster to Donald Trump’s speech 
regarding Mexican rapists. More broadly, there has been a resurgence of political parties where a 
core element of their platform is restricting immigration. This has occurred across a range of 
countries, including but not limited to Germany (AfD), Denmark (Danish People’s Party), Norway 
(Progress Party) and Italy (Lega Nord). While these parties differ markedly in their initial platforms, 
all have converged towards an anti-immigration, and indeed, an anti-immigrant position. Again, this 
has often manifested itself in extreme public statements. For instance, in 2003, Umberto Bossi, the 
Lega Nord leader at the time, suggested that Italian authorities open fire on boats carrying migrants 
(interview to Corriere della Sera, 16th June 2003). 
The potential explanations for these developments are numerous. For instance, there is a debate 
over the extent to which they reflect economic, broader social or institutional factors (Mayda, 2006; 
Arzheimer, 2009; Hatton, 2016). The existing literature almost exclusively focuses on how the 
presence of immigrants in a given area influences political views of the electorate. Most notably, a 
recent literature suggests that this is the case and demonstrates a positive relationship between the 
proportion of immigrants in a given area and the receipt of votes by anti-immigration parties (see, for 
instance, Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone et al., 2016; Dinas et al, 2016; Sekeris and Vasilakis, 
2016). The mechanism explored in this literature is how immigrant inflows shape the attitudes and 
voting patterns of natives, for instance their tendency to vote for right wing parties with anti-
immigration platforms. More generally, it has been demonstrated that immigrant inflows lead to an 
increase in anti-immigrant attitudes in a given location (Halla et al., 2017). 
However, we know little about how the rise of anti-immigration parties influences immigration 
behaviour and patterns. One of the stated aims of these parties is to either legally restrict entry of 
immigrants or to deter them in other ways. This paper contributes to our understanding in this area 
by asking the question, does the presence of anti-immigration parties influence the location decisions 
of immigrants and/or ethnic minority groups? The previous literature treats the location choices of 
immigrants as a nuisance factor to be controlled for. For instance, a number of papers use the 
historical location of migrant networks as a source of exogenous variation in an attempt to hold 
immigrant sorting constant (Halla et al., 2017; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone et al., 2016), while 
recently Dustman et al. (2016) relies on the randomisation of the location of new immigrants to 
Denmark. We adopt an alternative approach to the existing literature and examine this related, but 




It is important to understand the effect on immigrant location decisions given the wealth of 
evidence on the marked positive effects of immigration on local economic outcomes (Peri, 2012; 
Hong and McClaren, 2015; Nunn et al., 2017). The rise of anti-immigration parties might suggest 
that immigration produces at least short run costs to some groups. While a subject of long-standing 
debate, recent findings show null or even positive effects of immigrants on the wages of native low-
skilled workers (Foged and Peri, 2016; Peri and Yasenov, 2018). In addition, immigration appears to 
produce large long-term economic benefits. For instance, Nunn et al. (2017), examining the causal 
impact of immigrants into the United States between 1850 and 1920 on economic and social 
outcomes 100 years later, show positive effects on income, educational attainment, urbanization, 
unemployment and poverty. Consistent with previous research, they do not find evidence that these 
long-run returns came at the expense of short-run costs. 
We focus on the case of municipal elections in Northern Italy. This region has seen the ascent of 
a party with a core anti-immigration political platform, Lega Nord (the ‘Northern League’).1 We 
construct a dataset of municipal mayoral elections in Italy for the years 2002-2014. Our chief interest 
is in how anti-immigrant feelings and the ascent of anti-immigrant political parties influence 
immigrant location decisions. Our approach to disentangling the effect of immigration and local anti-
immigrant feeling is to focus on the effect of electing a mayor belonging to or supported by the anti-
immigration party Lega Nord on the location decisions of immigrants. We focus on narrow points of 
comparison between municipalities in a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD): by comparing 
municipalities where Lega Nord mayoral candidates won or lost by small margins of victory, we 
argue that we uncover credibly causal effects of anti-immigrant parties on inflows and outflows of 
immigrants. 
To summarise our results, we find that the election of a Lega Nord mayor leads to a reduction in 
the net flow of immigrant in the municipality. These effects are large, in the order of a 10-12% 
reduction in annual immigrant net flows into a municipality. This appears to be driven by a reduction 
in inflows into these municipalities, generated by a mixture of immigrants already resident in Italy 
and newly registered immigrants. These effects are concentrated in smaller municipalities and areas 
with lower average levels of education. Furthermore, Lega Nord mayoral victories appear to have no 
effect on immigrant mobility in periods before Lega Nord adoption of an explicitly anti-immigration 
platform. Together this suggests that it is the anti-immigration stance of Lega Nord driving these 
effects, and that this gains more traction in areas where immigrants may be more visible and/or there 
is more underlying hostility towards them. This evidence highlights the potential for marked changes 
in immigrants’ behaviour as a result of political events such as the Brexit vote, Trump presidential 
victory and the current Italian government (which includes Lega Nord as one of the two coalition 
partners), where anti-immigration policies were at the forefront. This is likely to have economically 





The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides institutional 
background and describes the data sources. The third section sets out the empirical methodology. 
This is followed by four sections focusing, respectively, on the main results, validation checks, 
robustness, and a discussion of potential mechanisms. The final section concludes and discusses 
avenues for further research.  
 
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA 
	
The	Institutional	System	
There are over 8,000 municipalities in Italy. Municipal administrations are responsible for a range of 
public services, such as the management of public utilities (local roads, water, sewage, garbage 
collection etc), local police, traffic enforcement, the provision of public housing and transportation, 
nursery schools, and assistance to elderly people. Within the administration, Municipal Councils 
(Consiglio Comunale) are endowed with legislative power, while executive authority is assigned to a 
Mayor (Sindaco) who heads an Executive Committee (Giunta Comunale). Municipal governments 
are responsible for a number of very important services that have a great impact on citizens’ daily 
lives, and voters are typically highly interested in their composition and performance. This is 
reflected in high average voter turnout at municipal elections (for instance 73% of eligible voters 
turned out at the 2009 municipal elections). 
Municipal elections in Italy are held every 5 years.2 There is variation in the timing of the 
electoral cycles such that each year a large, but different, subset of municipalities have elections. 
Elections typically occur in Spring. The electoral system for municipalities was changed 
substantially in 1993. This included the introduction of direct elections of the mayor, along with a 
different electoral mechanism for smaller (less than 15,000 inhabitants) or larger municipalities 
(greater or equal to 15,000 inhabitants)3. In small municipalities, mayors are elected through a first-
past-the-post system, while there is a runoff system in large municipalities. City Councils are elected 
at-large through an open-list proportional representation system. Each mayoral candidate is linked to 
a number of city-council lists (only one for small municipalities). The list(s) linked to the winning 
mayor are automatically awarded the majority of seats in the Council: 60% for large municipalities, 
two-thirds for small municipalities. This implies that mayoral candidates of larger municipalities are 
often endorsed by visible multi-party coalitions, while in smaller municipalities coalitions tend to be 
grouped within ad-hoc unitary lists. These endorsements happen before the elections are clearly 
signalled during campaign and on the ballot paper. Importantly, no reconfigurations of coalitions are 
possible after the election. The vast majority of municipalities are small, while only 9% have more 
																																																								
2In certain circumstances, the legislature may not survive until the end of its legislative term, e.g. because of a 




than 15,000 inhabitants; note though that the majority of the population (59%) lives in these larger 
municipalities.  
Lega Nord (or the Northern League) is a political party that was founded by Umberto Bossi 
at the end of the Eighties as a federation of several regional parties of Northern Italy. Lega Nord’s 
support base is rooted in regions of Northern Italy (in particular in Lombardia and Veneto). At the 
2009 European Parliament Elections they received between 10% and 28% of the votes in the regions 
in our sample, finishing consistently in the top three by vote share, together with the two main left-
wing (Partito Democratico) and right-wing (Popolo delle Libertà) parties. Tables A1-A2, in the 
Appendix of the paper, reports the vote shares at the 2009 European Parliament elections and the 
number of mayors and city councillors disaggregated at the regional level.  
At the national level, the percentage of votes in political elections for the Lega Nord was 
approximately 8-10% in the Nineties, declined to about 5 percent in 2000s, then rose to 17% at the 
last national elections (in March, 2018), leading to a coalition government including Lega Nord.  In 
1993 a Lega Nord representative was elected as the mayor of Milan. Since 1994, Lega Nord took 
part, allied with centre-right parties, in several coalition governments led by Silvio Berlusconi. As 
part of this they obtained several national ministries, most notably the Interior Ministry and the 
Budget Ministry. The political platform of the Lega Nord comprises of political and fiscal federalism 
and regional autonomy (going as far as secession of Northern Italy or “Padania” from Italy), an 
emphasis on the “welfare dependency” of Southern Italy, the protection of Northern Italian cultural 
differences and regional identities, and lower taxation, especially for small and medium enterprises. 
In this sense, Lega Nord has always taken anti-establishment political positions. 
Since the new millennium, Lega Nord abandoned the distinctly ‘pro-North’ focus and 
reoriented its political message towards issues of immigration and crime. They have taken an 
increasingly anti-immigration stance and exploited the fear of increasing immigration into Italy. 
Using populist rhetoric, Lega Nord has associated immigration with rising criminality, drugs, 
unemployment, excessive public spending and welfare crisis. In doing so, Lega Nord has, on 
occasion, used racist and xenophobic propaganda, especially against Roma and immigrants from 
African countries. 4  Lega Nord is increasingly aligned with right-wing populist parties such as 
France's National Front and the Freedom Party of Austria. This has occurred in a period in which 
immigration into Italy has increased substantially. For example, the number of non-Italians legally 
resident in Italy increased from 1,340,000 in 2002 to over 5 million in 2015. The presence of 
immigrants increases all across Italy, but more so in the North, where there are better economic 
conditions and Lega Nord experiences strong support.5 
																																																								
4 For example, the current secretary general of the party recurrently spoke about “bulldozing” to the ground 
Roma camps and likened the effects of immigration (together with the demographic decline of native Italians – 
in our sample Italian residents grew at around about 0.3% each year) to “ethnic cleansing”. 




Part of this increase is related to the recent refugee crises: sea arrivals in Italy have increased 
more than tenfold between 2010 and 2016, with an average of around 175,000 per year since 2014.6 
Most of these migrants are hosted through programmes tendered by the central government to local 
charitable associations in refugee centres (called CAS or SPRAR). In contrast to other countries, 
such as Germany, in Italy there is no compulsory distribution of refugees and municipalities join 
standard reception programmes voluntarily. The central government can still intervene and force 
local governments to accept immigrants, but as this option would create social tension it is rarely 
adopted. Mayors have an important role in deciding the location of asylum seekers and refugees. 
Economic migrants with a valid residence permit (issued by the central government) are free to move 
within the country. At the same time, mayors may implement policies, which are more or less 
welcoming to immigrants, or more generally to people with their demographic characteristics. As an 
example, the Lega Nord town secretary for the city of Pisa, Edoardo Ziello, declared: “On social 
issues, we always put Italians first; the PD [Democratic Party] puts immigrants first and we will send 
them home”. (Financial Times, November 15, 2017).7  
Initiatives undertaken by Lega Nord mayors to discourage immigrants from settling in their 
communities have often gained the headlines of national and local newspapers. In 1997 the mayor of 
Treviso managed to remove all benches in the surroundings of the railway station with the aim of 
stopping immigrants from congregating in that area.8 More recently, the mayor of the small village 
of Cascina, in Tuscany, asked – following the letter of the law – immigrants to provide burdensome 
paperwork to prove they do not own real estate in their country of origin if they want to access 
housing benefits.9 More broadly, the racist rhetoric often used by Lega Nord may also to create an 




The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data drawn from three sources.  
First, we use administrative data on resident foreigners in each Italian municipality (at the 
end of each calendar year), available from ISTAT, the National Statistical Institute from year 2002-
2014. 10  It is a legal requirement for all residents, Italians and foreigners, to register at the 
municipality where one resides. Registration is a requirement for access to a range of public services, 
such as health care provision, school admission, and social and housing benefits. Only legal 
																																																								
6 A large share of this increase occurs after our period of analysis, and our main results are largely unaffected 
by excluding 2012-2014. This combined with the fact that refugees make up a small share of legal immigration 
in our period of analysis suggests that it is not settlement of the most recent refugee wave driving our main 
results.  
7See https://www.ft.com/content/bfabfcc2-c882-11e7-aa33-c63fdc9b8c6c 
8 See La Repubblica, 15th October 2015. 
9 See La Stampa, 27th February 2018. 
10Freely available at http://demo.istat.it/index_e.html 
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immigrants can register.11 A concern with this data is possible measurement error, particularly if 
individuals take time to change their official residential registration. This is most likely to be true for 
Italians. They may have access to another address (e.g. a relative’s home or a second home) and for 
them the consequences of registration at a location other than their actual residence may be small. In 
contrast, immigrants are unlikely to have access to a second address within Italy. Anyone found not 
to be living at their registered residence is struck off the register. 12  For immigrants, this is 
consequential as a key requirement as to gain Italian citizenship is a continuous record of residential 
registration. In the case where an immigrant is removed from the register this 10 year period is reset 
to zero. This, when combined with the residence requirement for access to public services, provides 
strong incentives for legal immigrants to maintain accurate registration information.  
For each municipality-year combination we observe the following: the number of newly 
registered foreigners coming from other municipalities; the number of cancelled foreigners going to 
other municipalities; the number of newly registered foreigners coming from abroad; the number of 
cancelled foreigners going abroad; the total number of foreigners; the municipal population. Our 
main dependent variable is the Net Immigrant Flow in municipality i in year t as a percentage of its 
total population at time T-1 (the year before the most recent municipal election) multiplied by 100: 
 




1iTit Population Native TotalForeigners RegisteredNewly ) and Immigrant Outflows 
(
1iTit Population Native TotalForeigners Cancelled ) are defined in a similar way.  
Our second source of data covers elections and  is obtained from the Italian Interior 
Ministry.13 For each election in each municipality we have data on the number of votes obtained by 
each mayoral candidate in the first ballot (and in the second ballot, when it takes place) and the 
parties/lists supporting each of them.  
We focus on roughly 4,000 municipalities in Northern Italian regions (Piemonte, Lombardia, 
Liguria, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna) omitting municipalities in geographical 
areas in which the electoral strength of the Lega Nord is negligible.14 These account for over 25 
																																																								
11 There is very little available data on undocumented migrants. The most reputable source are the yearly 
Immigration Reports by Fondazione ISMU, which estimates that in our sample period approximately 15% of 
immigrants in Italy were undocumented (http://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Stime-irregolari-
ISMU_1991-2013_.xls). Bianchi et al. (2012) demonstrates how provincial level undocumented immigrant 
presence is highly correlated with documented	 immigrant numbers. This should in principle attenuate the 
potential omitted variable bias from including only documented immigrants. 
12In Italy the registry officer (Ufficiale di anagrafe) has the legal duty of ascertaining that the residence of 
every citizen is accurate and not fictitious. By law, a municipal officer must check the actual presence of any 
new resident of the municipality. 
13 See the website: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=G 
14	We exclude the regions in which none of the Lega Nord candidates has been elected as Mayor in the period 
considered (see Table A2).	
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million inhabitants, almost half of the overall population of Italy, hosting 60% of the legal immigrant 
population. As highlighted in Appendix Table A2, these are the regions where Lega Nord has an 
established presence both in terms of votes in European Parliament elections but also in 
municipalities.  
Among these regions, we include in our sample all the municipalities in which a Lega Nord 
supported candidate has run for municipal elections; hence we exclude those municipalities in which 
we do not observe any mayoral candidate supported by Lega Nord in our period of analysis.  
This leads to dropping municipalities with 7 million inhabitants in total, see Table A3, 
accounting for just over a quarter of the population in Northern Italy, residing in about 2,800 (mostly 
very small) municipalities. In most of these places, especially in very small villages, the presence of 
Lega Nord or any other established political party in municipal elections is, in practice,  difficult to 
ascertain as mayoral candidates run under a generic “Lista Civica” (translatable as “Local List”) 
banner, and not under national-party labels (such as Lega Nord, Partito Democratico, etc.). In many 
cases these mayoral candidates are indeed non-partisan figures, not belonging to any national 
political party. However, this may also hide situations in which local politicians with locally known 
partisan allegiance decide – for whatever reason – to run under a non-partisan local label. We 
examine the robustness of our results to this issue later. Finally, we omit a handful (35 municipality-
year) of observations with very large net immigration flows that seem likely to be a result of 
misreporting. In practice, this exclusion does not change our estimates of interest but does, in some 
cases, harm precision. This leaves us with 13,852 municipality-year observations (from 1,796 





As shown in Table A3, municipalities in our sample differ from other municipalities in 
Northern regions in terms of a number of characteristics: they are larger, richer, slightly more 
educated and with stronger flows of immigrants. As discussed above, these differences reflect in part 
the loss of many small municipalities in which it is difficult to ascertain whether a mayoral candidate 
is supported by Lega Nord (in these municipalities candidates typically run under a generic “Lista 
Civica”). 
For each municipality-election combination we observe the elected Mayor and the margin of 
victory of the winning candidate. We create a dummy, Lega Nord Mayor, equal to one when a 
mayoral candidate who belongs to Lega Nord is elected or a mayor is elected on a coalition ticket 
that includes Lega Nord and zero when a Lega Nord candidate is present but not elected.15 We 
rescale the margin of victory such that it is positive for a victory by a Lega Nord mayoral candidate 
																																																								
15 In later robustness tests we examine variants to this definition of the Lega Nord dummy variable.  
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or a candidate supported by Lega Nord and negative when the winning mayoral candidate was not 
supported by Lega Nord. In the cases where a second round is held we use these votes as they 
determine the final electoral outcome.16  
Our final source of data are geographic and economic characteristics of each municipality -  
Population, average years of schooling (Education), Altitude, Area (in sq. km),  a dummy whether 
the municipality is urban (Urban), share of employment in agriculture (Share Agriculture), industry 
(Share Industry), and trade (Share Trade) collected from ISTAT’s Italian Census of Population (from 
years 1991, 2001 and 2011). We also use data on average annual municipal taxable income (from 
1999 to 2013) (Income) that is sourced from the Finance Ministry. 
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The 
inflow of immigrants (as a percentage of municipal population) is 1.578 percentage points, the 
outflow is 0.974 percentage points, and hence the net inflow is 0.604 percentage points per annum. 
In 28% of cases of our election outcomes we observe a Lega Nord Mayor. The average margin of 
victory of Lega Nord is -16%. The mean municipal population in our sample is about 17,728 (while 
the median is 6,672) and the average years of education are 8.4. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
3. METHODOLOGY 
	
The main empirical difficulty in assessing the effect of Lega Nord on immigration mobility is the 
effect of prior immigrant location on voting patterns. The latter effect is, in essence, the focus of the 
previous literature on immigrants and voting patterns. At the same time, a range of research 
demonstrates how the existence of immigrants may in itself be attractive to prospective migrants. In 
this sense, immigrant location decisions are a function of the existing spatial distribution of 
immigrants (Card, 2001). More generally, there are likely unobserved local characteristics of 
municipalities that may influence both Lega Nord vote shares and the attractiveness of the location to 
immigrants. In addition, observed and unobserved local factors (for example, economic conditions) 
may simultaneously affect both immigrant flows and votes to Lega Nord. All of these provide 
challenges to causally identifying our relationship of interest.	
Our identification strategy is to focus on mayoral elections involving a Lega Nord candidate 
where there was a narrow margin of victory. This forms the basis of a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) approach (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) where the main identifying 
assumption is that all potential confounders (local conditions, amenities, the effect of past immigrant 
stock/flows) are smooth at the point of a zero margin of victory.  Our main estimates are variants of: 
 
																																																								
16 In practice, excluding these elections entirely does not change our results.		
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where itY  is a measure of immigration into municipality i at year t (initially we use Net Immigrant 
Flow but in subsequent estimates we consider alternative immigration flow measures); Lega Nord 
MayoriT is a binary indicator that municipality i in the most recent election year T has a Mayor 
elected who is a member of, or is supported by, Lega Nord. In our main estimates we evaluate the 
impact of the election of a Lega Nord Mayor on the flow of immigrants in the same year of the 
election (t=T) and in the subsequent years following the election (t=T+1; t=T+2; t=T+3; t=T+4). 
The parameter of interest is J and provides the treatment effect of the election of a Lega Nord Mayor 
on immigration flows. The election of a Lega Nord mayor varies at an election-municipality level, 
while the data on immigration is at a municipal-year level. Hence, J provides the average annual 
effect of electing a Lega Nord Mayor on immigration flows across the electoral cycle. 
f(MarginVictory) is a flexible polynomial function of the margin of victory and the interaction term 
allows for different functional forms on the two sides of the cut-off. 1-iTX  is a vector of 
municipality characteristics (Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, Urban, Share 
Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade) which are held constant at pre-election values (T-1) to 
avoid issues of reverse causality. We also include province ( PP ) and year fixed effects ( tG ); ε is an 
error term. In subsequent estimates we also adopt non-parametric, optimal bandwidth based 
approaches. As we consider multiple observations for each municipality standard errors are clustered 
at the municipal level in all regressions.  
 
4. RESULTS 
Table 2 reports estimates of the effect of the election of a Lega Nord mayor on net migration flows at 
the municipal level. In all specifications, we control for year dummies, provincial dummies and 
municipal characteristics. We stress, however, that the inclusion of these controls do not materially 
affect the pattern of our main estimates. As an initial point of comparison in column (1) we estimate 
our model without controlling for the Margin of Victory, this provides a simple difference between 
Lega Nord led municipalities and others. The results demonstrate a negative correlation between the 
election of a Lega Nord Mayor and the net inflow of immigrants: a Lega Nord Mayor is associated 
with a reduction of the net inflows of immigrants by 0.032 percentage points.  
The remaining columns in Table 2 report OLS estimates in a RD framework, that is, 
controlling for the Margin of Victory. In columns (2) and (3) we run our estimates on the whole 
sample and include respectively linear and quadratic terms for the margin of victory allowing for 
different trends on the two sides of the cut-off. The underlying result is that the election of a Lega 
Nord Mayor leads to lower net inflows of immigrants in the municipality. The election of a Lega 
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Nord Mayor in a municipality induces a statistically significant reduction in the net inflow of 
immigrants of between 0.070 and 0.083 percentage points (p-values<0.05). Hence, this suggests that 
the estimates in column (1) understate the negative effect of Lega Nord supported mayors on 
immigrant flows. The coefficients on the forcing variable, the Margin of Victory of Lega Nord, are 
typically near zero and not statistically significant. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
We further examine the sensitivity of these estimates using Local Linear Regressions and   
choosing the optimal bandwidth by two alternative methods developed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012) (henceforth IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (henceforth CCT), respectively. 
These methodologies rely on running a linear regression on a subset of the initial sample within an 
optimally-defined margin of victory. Using these methods leads to optimal bandwidths of 0.233 (IK) 
and 0.141 (CCT) above and below the zero margin of victory, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) 
report local linear estimates using these two alternative optimal bandwidths. While there is some loss 
in precision, particularly for the narrower bandwidth chosen with the CCT approach, the point 
estimates are largely unaffected (-0.060 and -0.076).  
In summary, the main estimate of interest is relatively stable across a variety of 
specifications. The estimates from our RDD models range between -0.06 and -0.08 percentage 
points. This corresponds to approximately 0.10-0.12 of a standard deviation of the dependent 
variable, which is sizeable. Hence, our initial evidence suggests that narrow victories by the Lega 
Nord Mayors substantially reduce net immigrant flows into the municipality.17 
Our results are visually presented in Figure 2 where we plot the fitted values from a running-
mean smoothing of the net flow of immigrants fitted over the margin of victory of the mayor 
performed separately on each side of the cutoff point, as well as the 95% confidence intervals and 
bin scatter plot. This gives some supportive graphical evidence of the existence of the discontinuity 
in immigrant flows when a Lega Nord mayor is elected. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
While our observations are at municipal level, our main estimates include fixed effects at a 
provincial level. This, in part, represents a pragmatic choice with respect to the amount of within 
municipal variation in our data. In practice, we observe on average 2.7 elections per municipality in 
our data. This lack of time-series variability becomes more acute in the bandwidth estimates where 
only narrow municipal elections are retained in the estimating sample. Nonetheless, in Table 3, we 




included	 in	 the	 analysis.	 In	 our	 setting,	we	 note	 both	 the	 large	 number	 of	municipalities	 in	 our	main	




effect of a Lega Nord Mayor that are larger in magnitude to those reported in Table 2. The RDD 
estimates range from -0.10 to -0.16, although the estimate using the CCT bandwidth is no longer 
statistically significant.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
It is also worth emphasising the source of variation that identifies the Lega Nord effects in 
the models with municipal fixed effects. These provide the impact of a within-municipality change in 
Mayor (from or to Lega Nord). In the case where there is a change in mayoral affiliation (rather than, 
for instance, two consecutive narrow victories by a Lega Nord mayor) we might expect any effect on 
subsequent immigrant mobility to be larger. This fits with the results presented in Table 3 showing 
that the effect of a Lega Nord victory is substantially larger when it involves a change in mayor. 
These estimates suggest the routinely negative pattern of our earlier estimates are not a 
function of controlling for time-invariant un-observables at a higher municipal level. In all following 
estimates we revert to controlling for provincial fixed effects.  
The effects we observe for Net Immigrant Flow might result from a range of underlying 
migration behaviours. Specifically, they could reflect any combination of inflows and outflows, of 
immigrants already resident legally in Italy, new legal entrants to Italy, or new registrations of 
previously illegally resident migrants. Our initial step is to attempt to decompose our estimates into 
inflows and outflows, irrespective of status of the immigrant. Table 4 reports RD estimates 
separately for inflows (columns 1 to 4) and outflows (columns 5 to 8) that result from analogous 
specifications to our earlier net flows models. These estimates are suggestive of a process where 
inflows are affected by the election of a Lega Nord Mayor and there is no response from immigrants 
currently residing in the municipality. The estimates of inflows are routinely negative and sizeable, 
although for the optimal bandwidth models these estimates become imprecise and no longer 
statistically significant. The magnitude of these effects are similar to the net effects reported in Table 
2.18 The estimates for outflows are never statistically significant and, while negative, are essentially 
zero. These results fit with a view that immigrants, when comparing different alternative places of 
residence, might avoid communities that are either perceived as unwelcoming or unlikely to adopt 
policies in their interest. In contrast, existing resident immigrants may be less responsive due to costs 
associated with out-migration.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
We next seek to understand whether these migration patterns reflect movements of existing 
legal immigrants within Italy, or alternatively, new registrations of immigrants. For instance, it could 
be that immigrants already living in Italy have better information compared to new registering 
																																																								
18	Unreported municipal fixed effects models reveal the same pattern, (negative) inflow effects are of the same 
magnitude as those reported in Table 4. In addition, the bandwidth estimates are statistically significant at the 
1% (IK) and 10% (CCT) level, respectively. There is no effect on outflows.  
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immigrants and/or more choice over location. It is, however, worth re-iterating two points. First, 
movements by existing immigrants are numerically dominant by some margin. Second, data on new 
arrivals in the country also might include the new registration of previously undocumented 
immigrants who acquire legal status, and data on immigrants “moving out of the country” includes 
visa ‘over-stayers’, i.e. immigrants whose visa expires (and therefore are cancelled from the 
register), but do not leave the country. We are unable to distinguish between these two groups. This 
leads to some care being necessary when interpreting these estimates. 
Table 5 presents estimates for flows disaggregated by immigrant type (moving within Italy 
and flows from/to abroad). For brevity, we report estimates that use the full sample but include a 
quadratic polynomial for the forcing variable on either side of the zero margin of victory (i.e. 
equivalent to specification reported in column (3) in Table 2).  
The first two columns provide estimates for net flows. For both groups, existing and new 
registrants, there is a reduction in net flows following the election of a Lega Nord Mayor. We then 
report the same estimates split by inflows and outflows to the municipality. These estimates again 
show a roughly even split between the two types of potential incoming immigrants to a municipality.  
The sizeable reduction of inflows from immigrants who were previously registered in other 
Italian municipalities is of additional interest. These, by construction, are unlikely to reflect the 
registration patterns of previously undocumented immigrants already residing in the municipality 
prior to the election. There is a zero effect on outflows for either those leaving to another 
municipality or those moving abroad. In this sense, the earlier zero results for outflows do not appear 
to be hiding heterogeneity by type of outflow.19  
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
To this point our approach has been to estimate the impact of Mayoral elections on average 
annual immigration flows for each 5-year electoral cycle. A natural question is whether there are any 
temporal patterns in these migration effects. In Table 6 we first build a variable Lag that measures 
the years spent from the last election (Lag is equal to 0 for the year of election,20 1 for the following 
year, and so on). We report estimates based on the parametric, quadratic specification. In Column 1 
we consider the subsample of observations in election years and in the year immediately afterwards 
(Lag≤1). In Column 2 we consider the complementary sample of the years furthest from elections 
(Lag>1). Columns 3 and 4 consider instead the full sample. In Column 3 we add a dummy for Lag>1 
(years distant from elections) and its interaction with Lega Nord Mayor. In Column 4 we add a 
dummy variable for each year in the election cycle and interact each of them with Lega Nord Mayor. 
Across specifications, we find a strong negative immediate effect of Lega Nord: for example we find 
																																																								
19	Estimates for the other approaches are available on request. These follow the same patterns as those 
reported in Table 5 but are typically less precise. Consistent results are also found when municipality fixed 
effects are introduced. 
20 Notice that typically municipal elections are held in spring. 
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a negative (-0.12) and significant effect of Lega Nord in Column 1 (years close to elections) and a 
smaller and imprecisely estimate effect (p-value 0.11) in Column 2 (years far from elections). 
Similarly, in Column 3 we find that the interaction between Lega Nord Mayor and the dummy for 
“years far from elections” (Lag>1) is positive and significant, exemplifying how the effect of 
electing a Lega Nord mayor dwindles with time. In Column 4, we can note how time dummies 
interacted with LegaNord  are always positive even if in some cases are not statistically significant, 
giving further suggestive evidence that the effect tends to attenuate as times goes by. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
5. VALIDITY AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
5.1. VALIDITY TESTS 
We perform a number of validity tests to investigate the identifying assumptions of the RD approach. 
A key RDD assumption is that unobservable characteristics do not vary discontinuously around the 
cutoff point and the cutoff rule provides exogenous variations in the treatment (i.e. as good as a 
randomised experiment). As it is standard in the literature, we focus on observed characteristics and 
test the continuity of the covariates distribution at the threshold to control whether the assumptions 
of the RDD are satisfied. More precisely, we estimate an analogous equation to (1), where the 
dependent variable is, in turn, all the predetermined characteristics. This provides a test of whether a 
discontinuity is present in any of these variables when a Lega Nord Mayor is elected. We control for 
the margin of victory and for the interaction term between the Lega Nord Mayor and the forcing 
variable, and for provincial and electoral years fixed effects. Appendix Table A4 presents the 
coefficients on Lega Nord Mayor from RD regression using pre-determined characteristics focusing, 
alternatively, on the full sample, the IK bandwidth and CCT bandwidth. Overall, our estimates show 
that a Lega Nord Mayor is not associated with any discontinuity in municipal predetermined 
characteristics. Since a few of these characteristics are not balanced we include them as control 
variables in our estimating equations, although we stress that our main results are not influenced by 
their inclusion or exclusion. 
As an additional examination of our research design in Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix of 
the paper, we plot a histogram of the margin of victory in 50 bins and the density of the same 
variable around the zero cut-off as suggested by McCrary (2008). Discontinuities at the cutoff point 
might raise concerns that the candidates are able to manipulate the margin of victory. While the 
histogram does not show any evidence of jumps or grouping of elections around the threshold, the 
McCrary density provides weak evidence of a discontinuity at the cutoff. We emphasise, however, 
that there is no evidence of electoral frauds in municipal elections in Italy; the sporadic Court cases 
that occur generally involve direct “vote buying” (i.e. people promising to vote in a particular way in 
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exchange of money), rather than manipulation of final results. This, we feel, provides a degree of 
confidence regarding our research design and resultant estimates.  
 
5.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
As a first robustness check, in Table 7 we carry out a falsification exercise in the spirit of Lee (2008). 
We investigate if the election of a Lega Nord Mayor in year T has any effect on the flows of 
immigrants in the previous years. In our RDD framework this should not occur and any anticipation 
effects would cast doubt on our identification approach. We estimate two separate models one for the 
year prior to the election, the other for two years previous. In both cases there is no evidence of a 
link between a future, narrow, LN victory and migration patterns. The point estimates in both cases 
are close to zero and not statistically significant.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
To this point, our measure of Lega Nord Mayors has consisted of settings where a Lega 
Nord member is either the mayoral candidate or where a Lega Nord member is part of the coalition. 
We seek to examine the robustness of our results to two alternative measures of Lega Nord Mayor, 
one more extensive and the other more restrictive.  
The first recognises the fact that in some (mostly small) municipalities we cannot separately 
identify Lega Nord candidates from other centre-right candidates and have excluded them from our 
main analysis. In Table 8, we report estimates in which we include these additional municipalities 
(2620 municipality-year observations) that were previously excluded as we were not able to identify 
Lega Nord candidates accurately. We now treat centre-right coalitions in these municipalities as 
coalitions including Lega Nord. As can be seen in columns (1) to (3), the main results of interest are 
materially unaffected by this new definition of Lega Nord.  
The second is to consider as “Lega Nord” only municipalities where the mayor or the deputy 
mayor belongs to Lega Nord. The concern is that in previous estimates we treated all Lega Nord 
coalitions equally, irrespective of the running position of the Lega Nord member in the coalition. A 
related issue is whether our results demonstrate a broad centre-right effect, rather than a Lega Nord 
effect per se. Therefore, we re-estimated our main models identifying coalitions as Lega Nord only if 
the Lega Nord member was the mayor or deputy mayor. These estimates are reported in Table 8 
columns (4) to (6). These estimates are larger in absolute magnitude, in the order of twice the size, 
and more precise. This suggests that our earlier estimates are, if anything, conservative. The take-
home message is that the estimates reported in Table 8 provide us with confidence that the Lega 




INSERT TABLE 8 
6. MECHANISMS 
We have, to this point, demonstrated a robust negative relationship between the election of a 
mayor belonging to the Lega Nord party and net immigration flow into a municipality. In practice, 
these effects might reflect a range of underlying mechanisms. In this section, we seek to provide 
evidence aimed at understanding these.  
One point of contention is the extent to which our results reflect the anti-immigrant stance 
and policies of Lega Nord or other parts of their political platform.  For instance, Lega Nord mayors 
may implement policies that generate poorer economic conditions for immigrants or other 
disamenities that discourage migrants from moving in. As an initial step to investigating this, we 
examine the period immediately prior to our main period of analysis. This period, 1991-2001, is 
period where Lega Nord was a prominent political party, but where immigration had not yet become 
a central component of their political platform. Unfortunately, data on immigrants at a municipal 
level do not exist for this period, but are available at the provincial level. These are immigrant flow 
data provided by the Minister of the Interior.21 Using data on local administrators,22 we then create a 
variable for each province measuring the percentage of municipalities within the province ruled by a 
Lega Nord mayor. Then, we regress the flow of immigrants in each province on the percentage of 
municipalities in the province ruled by a Lega Nord Mayor using provincial fixed effects and year 
dummies. The results are reported in column (1) of Table 9.  For this period, we find no relation 
between the percentage of municipalities with a Lega Nord Mayor and the flows of immigrants. We 
then re-estimate these models for 2002-2014, our main period of analysis and one in which Lega 
Nord took a more marked anti-immigration stance. In contrast to previous results, as shown in 
column 2 of Table 9, for this period a higher percentage of Lega Nord mayors in the province is 
associated with low net immigration. This is consistent with our municipal level estimates, and 
suggest that this change by Lega Nord towards openly anti-immigration politics is driving our 
results.  
 
  INSERT TABLE 9  
 
With this said, our results may reflect a response to a perceived increase in anti-immigration 
feeling and/or anti-immigrant policies. For instance in the former case, the election of a mayor with 
declared anti-immigration views may legitimise stigmatising behaviours and generate a more 
uncomfortable environment for immigrants.23 This type of effect has been, for instance, widely 
																																																								
21	We thank Guido De Blasio for providing us with these data.  
22 http:/dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/anagrafe-amministratori. 
23 We have also investigated if there is any impact on the mobility of natives. One might expect that natives 
that do not share the political stance of Lega Nord may also decide to leave or not move to the municipality. 
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discussed in the press 24  in relation to the election of Donald Trump who during his electoral 
campaign has portrayed immigrants as threats to American values and Americans’ safety. Similarly, 
there is evidence that recent ‘Brexit’ referendum in the United Kingdom led to a spike in anti-
foreigner crime. Simultaneously, the reduction in net migration may also reflect the expectation that 
a mayor supported by the Lega Nord will undertake political choices, for instance in terms of public 
expenditure, that will disadvantage immigrants.  
We seek to explore these two channels. First, we consider if specific characteristics of the 
municipality are important. This is informative insofar as these characteristics may reflect 
differences in likely channels of effect. Our starting place is to note that the literature on the effect of 
immigration on political attitudes and voting demonstrates that municipality size matters (Dustmann 
et al., 2016; Barone et al., 2016). Immigration inflows produce large increases in the votes obtained 
by far-right parties especially in small towns, while in large towns there is no impact. This may 
reflect a range of reasons such as higher segmentation in larger municipalities, higher education of 
natives and a longer history of immigration and diversity in larger towns and cities.   
As an initial step, following Halla et al. (2017), we weight our regressions with population 
size. Results are reported in Table 10. In the first column we run our estimates on the full sample and 
include a quadratic term of the margin of victory, while in column (2) and (3) we estimate local 
linear regressions considering respectively the IK and the CCT optimal bandwidths. We still find a 
negative effect of having elected a Lega Nord supported mayor on the net inflow of immigrants, 
however estimates become less precise. To further explore this, in columns (4) and (5) we run our 
regressions separately for municipalities with a population lower and greater than that the median of 
the distribution (6,684 inhabitants). While we find a negative and significant effect on smaller 
municipalities, there is essentially no effect for larger municipalities. 
 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
 
One reason for this may be the higher educational level of people living in larger cities in 
Italy. As suggested for instance by d’Hombres and Nunziata (2016), education is associated with a 
more positive attitude toward immigrants, this in turn may lead to a less hostile environment for 
immigrants after Lega Nord mayoral victories. To investigate this we created an interaction variable 
between the average number of years of education of the population living in each municipality 
(Education) and Lega Nord Mayor and re-estimated our main models (Table 10). Results, reported in 
Table 11, suggest that the negative impact of electing a Lega Nord supported mayor on the net 
inflow of immigrants becomes smaller as the average level of education of the population increases: 
																																																																																																																																																																										
However, as shown in Table A5, where we replicate the same specifications of Table 2 but consider as 
dependent variable the Net Native Flow, we do not find any effect on the location decisions of natives. 




the impact decreases by about one tenth for every extra year of (average) education in a municipality. 
Together, these results suggest that the effect of Lega Nord on immigrant flows is concentrated in 
smaller, less educated settings. While far from a clean test, these results provide some indication that 
it is in municipal settings where immigrants are likely to be more visible and face more hostility 
from native inhabitants that Lega Nord mayoral victories reduce immigrant shares.  
 
INSERT TABLE 11 
 
We next endeavor to provide evidence on the potential role of the immigrant orientation of 
policy choices. While difficult to observe and measure we have information on the budgetary choices 
of mayors in terms of public expenditure. More precisely, we use data from the municipal councils’ 
balance sheets to consider expenditures in the areas of social services. We estimate an analogue of 
equation (1) but considering as the dependent variable the fraction of social expenditures (the sum of 
expenditures devoted to social housing, to social assistance and care on total expenditures). While 
not solely directed towards non-Italians, the social expenditures are used extensively by immigrants 
due to their demographic and economic make-up. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 12, we 
find a negative effect of Lega Nord mayoral victories on these expenditures. However the effect is 
statistically significant only when restricting the sample to the CCT optimal bandwidth  (0.141). This 
pattern may simply reflect the fact that Lega Nord mayors are more likely to be fiscally conservative. 
To explore this in column (2) we perform the same exercise on another major part of municipal 
expenditure, that directed towards elderly people, a group in which immigrants are typically a very 
small minority. There is neither a statistically significant nor an economically meaningful effect of 
Lega Nord Mayors. Finally, in column (3) we consider as outcome variable total expenditure (in 
thousands of euros) and again we do not find any statistically significant effect of Lega Nord 
Mayors. This fits with recent regression discontinuity based evidence that suggests no difference in 
overall municipal expenditure according to Mayoral political alignment in Italy (Bracco et al., 2017). 
Similar findings (see Table A6) emerge when we include municipal fixed effects, which provide the 
impact of a within-municipality change in Mayor (from or to Lega Nord). In these estimates we find 
a negative and statistically significant effect of Lega Nord mayoral victories on social expenditures 
both when considering the full sample and when restricting to the CCT optimal bandwidth. Again, 
while far from definitive, this exercise suggests that part of the response of immigrants to Lega Nord 
mayoral victories may reflect reactions to the reduction in the provision of public services. This is an 
avenue that future research should consider.  
 





There appears to be a rapid and marked increase in the popularity and vote share of anti-immigration 
parties across a range of jurisdictions. While previous research considers the potential causes of this, 
and the extent to which immigration itself may generate support for these parties, little is known 
about how these patterns influence migration decisions. We provide evidence on this by examining 
mayoral elections in Northern Italy, and the effect of victories by Italy’s primary anti-immigration 
party, Lega Nord.  
We use a Regression Discontinuity framework to disentangle the causal effect of electing a 
Lega Nord mayor from municipal factors related to the electoral support for Lega Nord and from 
other potential omitted variables, by focusing on municipalities in which Lega Nord candidates win 
or lose the electoral competition by narrow margins.  
We demonstrate that immigrants’ location decisions react to the election of mayors of, or 
supported by, Lega Nord. Specifically, these events have marked effects on net flows of immigration 
in municipalities. This appears to be driven almost entirely by individuals choosing not to move into 
these places following the election of Lega Nord Mayors rather than by immigrants moving away 
from those municipalities. These decisions are concentrated in the early periods following the 
election and reflect a mixture of the choices of existing foreigners resident in Italy and newly 
registered immigrants. That these narrow victories of parties that utilise anti-immigrant rhetoric have 
a marked effect on immigrant behaviour is also noteworthy given the recent Brexit referendum and 
Donald Trump presidential victory. The attempt of these parties to gain popular support is likely to 
produce negative effects on local economies deriving from the foregone benefits that immigrants 
seem to produce on several economic outcomes (Peri, 2012; Hong and McClaren, 2015; Nunn et al., 
2017). The rise of far-right parties makes quantifying these costs highly relevant and an important 
focus for future research (Gamalerio, 2017).  
Another natural area of future research is to investigate what drives these patterns. We provide 
suggestive evidence that a relevant channel is represented by the increase in local hostility towards 
foreigners. Our results also suggest that immigrants’ location decisions react to changes in public 
policies that tend to penalise foreigners. However, our estimates are far from conclusive on this point 
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Notes. Each data point represents the bin sample average for Margin of Victory, the straight line is a first-order 
polynomial in Margin of Victory fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory threshold at zero 





Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Net Immigrant Flow 13,852 0.604 0.655 -2.700 5.367 
Immigrant Inflow 13,852 1.578 0.837 0.000 7.045 
Immigrant Outflow 13,852 0.974 0.609 0.000 5.462 
Lega Nord Mayor 13,852 0.281 0.449 0.000 1.000 
Margin of Victory (MV) 13,816 -0.159 0.263 -0.857 0.740 
Population 13,852 17.728 66.992 0.046 1256.211 
Education 13,852 8.364 0.716 5.964 12.042 
Income 13,852 19664.8 3664.8 9711.4 44270.7 
Area sqkm 13,852 0.030 0.043 0.001 0.653 
Altitude 13,852 0.184 0.187 0.000 2.035 
Urban 13,852 0.356 0.479 0.000 1.000 
Share Agric. 13,852 0.048 0.058 0.002 0.895 
Share Industry 13,852 0.457 0.110 0.118 0.817 
Share Trade 13,852 0.179 0.044 0.040 0.713 
Source: Istat Resident Foreigners; Historical Archive of Municipal Election, Interior Ministry; 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lega Nord Mayor -0.032** -0.070*** -0.083** -0.060* -0.076* 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) (0.044) 
Polynomial Order MV NO Linear Quadratic Linear Linear 
Optimal Bandwidth NO NO NO IK CCT 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13852 13816 13816 7004 4558 
R-squared 0.275 0.277 0.278 0.293 0.309 
Mean dep. var. 0.604 0.604 0.604 0.578 0.568 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is Net Immigrant Flow. Municipal characteristics are 
Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. 
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lega Nord  Mayor -0.123*** -0.122*** -0.157*** -0.109* -0.107 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.046) (0.058) (0.094) 
Polynomial Order MV NO Linear Quadratic Linear Linear 
Optimal Bandwidth NO NO NO IK CCT 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13852 13816 13816 7004 4558 
R-squared 0.502 0.504 0.504 0.537 0.563 
Mean dep. var. 0.604 0.604 0.604 0.578 0.568 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is Net Immigrant Flow. Municipal characteristics 
are Population, Education, Income, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors 
(reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. IK: 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immigrant INFLOWS Immigrant OUTFLOWS 
Lega Nord Mayor -0.078** -0.088* -0.065 -0.092 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.053) (0.070) (0.025) (0.034) (0.035) (0.045) 
Polynomial Order MV Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Linear Quadrati
c 
Linear Linear 
Optimal Bandwidth NO NO IK CCT NO NO IK CCT 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal 
characteristics 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13816 13816 7004 4558 13816 13816 7004 4558 
R-squared 0.345 0.346 0.350 0.352 0.437 0.437 0.433 0.442 
Mean dep. var. 1.579 1.579 1.630 1.634 0.975 0.975 1.051 1.067 
The table reports OLS estimates. Municipal characteristics are Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, 
Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. IK: Imbens, Kalyanaraman (2012); CCT: Calonico, 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) 












Lega Nord Mayor -0.044*** -0.044** -0.040* -0.047** 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.007) 
Polynomial Order MV Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal 
characteristics 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13816 13816 13816 13816 13816 13816 
R-squared 0.059 0.395 0.313 0.380 0.326 0.173 
Mean dep. var. 0.041 0.574 0.640 0.654 0.599 0.081 
The table reports OLS estimates. Municipal characteristics are Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, 
Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lag<=1 Lag>1 Full sample Full sample 
Lega Nord  Mayor -0.125*** -0.061 -0.108*** -0.111*** 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037)    
Lega Nord  Mayor*(Lag>1)   0.044**               
   (0.019)               
Lega Nord  Mayor*(Lag=1)    0.007    
    (0.026)    
Lega Nord  Mayor*(Lag=2)    0.022    
    (0.026)    
Lega Nord  Mayor*(Lag=3)    0.082*** 
    (0.027)    
Lega Nord  Mayor*(Lag=4)    0.036    
    (0.031)    
Polynomial Order MV Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5440 8376 13816 13816    
R-squared  0.270 0.292 0.278 0.278    
Mean dep. var.  0.604 0.605 0.604 0.604 
The table reports OLS estimates. (Lag=0 on election year). Municipal characteristics are Population, 
Education, Income, Area, Altitude, Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors 
(reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. * p< 0.10, ** 







 (1) (2) 
 T-1 T-2 
Lega Nord  Mayor -0.024 0.013 
 (0.066) (0.058) 
Polynomial Order MV Quadratic Quadratic 
Year dummies YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES 
Observations 2755 2714 
R-squared  0.272 0.257 
Mean dep. var.  0.851 0.777 
The table reports OLS estimates. Municipal characteristics are Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, 
Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Less Restrictive More Restrictive  
Lega Nord/Centre Right 
Coalition 
-0.076*** -0.057* -0.091**    
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.038)    
Lega Nord Mayor/Deputy 
Only 
   -0.143*** -0.097** -0.136**  
    (0.049) (0.047) (0.057)    
Polynomial Order MV Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear 
Optimal Bandwidth NO IK CCT NO IK CCT 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 16472 7891 5754 11060 5807 4143    
R-squared 0.273 0.297 0.296 0.272 0.299 0.303    
Mean dep. var. 0.624 0.601 0.571 0.618 0.616 0.578 
The table reports OLS estimates. Municipal characteristics are Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, 
Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. IK: Imbens, Kalyanaraman (2012); CCT: Calonico, 




Table 9. Net Immigrant Flow and Lega Nord Percentage of Mayors. Province-level data 
 (1) (2) 
 1991-2001 2002-2014 
Lega Nord Mayors at 
Provincial Level (%) 
0.014 -0.011*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) 
Provincial Fixed Effects YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES 
Observations 405 559 
R-squared 0.847 0.843 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the Net Immigrant Flow. 
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at 





Table 10. Municipality size and the effect of electing a Lega Nord Mayor. Weighted Least Squares and 
Heterogeneity by Municipal Population 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lega Nord  Mayor -0.217 -0.236** -0.112 -0.111** -0.037 
 (0.174) (0.116) (0.086) (0.050) (0.044) 
Weights Population Population Population NO NO 
Polynomial Order MV Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic 
Optimal Bandwidth  NO IK CCT NO NO 
Sample: Full  IK CCT Pop<6,684  Pop>6,684 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 6882 6924 
R-squared  0.335 0.332 0.376 0.258 0.349 
Mean dep. var.  0.604 0.578 0.568 0.519 0.688 
The table reports WLS estimates in Columns 1-3 and OLS in Columns 4-5. Municipal characteristics are 
Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. 
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal 
level. IK: Imbens, Kalyanaraman (2012); CCT: Calonico, Cattaneo, Titiunik (2014). * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** 





Table 11. Heterogeneous Effects of Electing a Lega Nord Mayor according to Educational Levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lega Nord Mayor -0.086** -0.064* -0.079* -0.109** -0.063 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.045) (0.055) (0.042) 
Education 0.029 0.035 0.055 0.010 -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) 
Education*Lega Nord Mayor 0.038* 0.033 0.034   
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.035)   
Polynomial Order MV Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic 
Optimal Bandwidth NO IK CCT NO NO 
Sample Full IK CCT Educ<8.34 Educ>8.34 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 6886 6930 
R-squared 0.278 0.293 0.309 0.311 0.300 
Mean dep. var.  0.604 0.578 0.568 0.625 0.583 
The table reports OLS estimates. Municipal characteristics are Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, 
Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. IK: Imbens, Kalyanaraman (2012); CCT: Calonico, 


















Lega Nord Mayor -0.240 -0.996** 0.190 0.190 4.972 7.325 
 (0.353) (0.503) ((0.226)) (0.257)       (3.928) (5.381) 
Polynomial Order 
MV 
Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear 
Optimal Bandwidth NO CCT NO CCT NO CCT 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal 
characteristics 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 11973        3981 12213 4057 12320 4085 
R-squared 0.821 0.863 0.839 0.982 0.982 0.977 
Mean dep. var. 10.406% 11.207% 0.925% 0.733% 14.389 17.206 
The table reports OLS estimates. Municipal characteristics are Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, 
Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. CCT: Calonico, 































Figure A3 Immigrant population as a percentage of total population at provincial level (by quintile). 
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Table A1. Native population, immigrant population and Lega Nord vote share at 2009 European 
Parliament elections by region. Regions in CAPITAL are those included in the regression sample. 
Regions are listed West to East, North to South 
Region Population Imm. Pop. % Immigrants % Lega Nord  
PIEMONTE 4,432,571 351,112 7.92 15.69 
Valle d'Aosta 127,065 7,509 5.91 4.38 
LOMBARDIA 9,742,676 904,816 9.29 22.73 
Alto Adige/Sud Tirolo 498,857 36,284 7.27 4.83 
Trentino 519,800 42,577 8.19 14.92 
VENETO 4,885,548 454,453 9.3 28.38 
FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA 1,230,936 94,976 7.72 17.46 
LIGURIA 1,615,064 104,701 6.48 9.86 
EMILIA-ROMAGNA 4,337,979 421,482 9.72 11.08 
Toscana 3,707,818 309,651 8.35 4.32 
Umbria 894,222 85,947 9.61 3.57 
Marche 1,569,578 131,033 8.35 5.47 
Lazio 5,626,710 450,151 8 1.07 
Abruzzo 1,334,675 69,641 5.22 1.3 
Molise 320,795 7,309 2.28 0.66 
Campania 5,812,962 131,335 2.26 0.47 
Puglia 4,079,702 73,848 1.81 0.31 
Basilicata 590,601 11,526 1.95 0.57 
Calabria 2,008,709 58,775 2.93 0.98 
Sicilia 5,037,799 114,632 2.28 0.27 
Sardegna 1,671,001 29,537 1.77 0.74 
 
  
    
   





Table A2. Mayors and City Councillors by region and political allegiance as at 1st January 2009. 







 N Civica Left Right Lega 
Nord 
N Civica Left Right Lega 
Nord 
PIEMONTE 1,201 1,076 59 66 12 15,673 13,69
8 
886 1,089 179 
Valle d'Aosta 74 73 1 0 0 924 924 0 0 0 
LOMBARDIA 1,539 1,069 51 419 188 21,732 14,49
1 
1197 6,044 2,597 
Alto Adige/Sud Tirolo 114 11 103 0 0 2,029 379 1580 70 2 
Trentino 223 219 2 2 0 3,483 3,468 11 4 0 
VENETO 577 283 49 245 79 8,915 4,336 1086 3,493 1,164 
FRIULI-VENEZIA 
GIULIA 
216 140 33 43 3 3,098 2,094 389 615 170 
LIGURIA 234 176 29 29 6 3,088 2,133 476 479 106 
EMILIA-ROMAGNA 347 211 108 28 7 5,324 2,849 1440 1,035 240 
Toscana 284 104 160 20 0 4,488 1,831 1945 712 11 
Umbria 92 56 28 8 0 1,431 1,092 228 111 0 
Marche 238 171 48 19 0 3,510 2,599 571 340 4 
Lazio 374 289 43 42 0 5,390 4,077 630 683 0 
Abruzzo 301 243 41 17 0 4,098 3,515 350 233 0 
Molise 134 131 0 3 0 1,607 1,533 33 41 0 
Campania 531 366 116 49 0 8,094 5,326 1808 960 0 
Puglia 245 134 57 54 0 4,343 2,379 1046 918 0 
Basilicata 126 88 31 7 0 1,712 1,270 331 111 0 
Calabria 386 286 80 20 0 5,207 3,206 1504 497 0 
Sicilia 384 249 45 90 0 5,478 3,349 636 1,493 0 






Table A3. Summary Statistics of municipalities with and without Lega Nord candidates 
 Lega not running Lega running  
 mean Sd mean Sd diff 
Net Immigrant flow 0.436 0.765 0.604 0.655 -0.168*** 
Immigrant Inflow 1.248 0.912 1.578 0.837 -0.330*** 
Immigrant Outflow 0.811 0.715 0.974 0.609 -0.163*** 
Population 2.603 3.155 18.150 74.751 -15.547*** 
Education 8.035 0.763 8.364 0. 715 -0.329*** 
Income 17,171.4 3643.921 19,664.980 3,664.646 -
2493.58*** 
Area, sq. km 0.023 0.026 0.030 0.043 -0.007*** 
Altitude 0.336 0.295 0.184 0.187 0.152*** 
Urban 0.077 0.266 0.356 0.478 -0.279*** 
Share Agric. 0.092 0.093 0.047 0.058 0.045*** 
Share Industry 0.424 0.114 0.456 0.110 -0.032*** 
Share Trade 0.180 0.057 0.179 0.440 -0.001*** 








 (1) (2) (3) 
 Whole Sample IK CCT 
 Population Population Population 
Lega Nord Mayor -4.961 -8.271 -2.056 
 (5.405) (6.467) (8.260) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Education Education Education 
Lega Nord Mayor -0.005 -0.019 -0.013 
 (0.034) (0.052) (0.067) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Income Income Income 
Lega Nord Mayor -125.104 -116.325 -330.977 
 (152.081) (224.241) (305.104) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Area sq.km Area sq.km Area sq.km 
Lega Nord Mayor -0.003* -0.004* -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Altitude Altitude Altitude 
Lega Nord Mayor 0.017* 0.006 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Urban Urban Urban 
Lega Nord Mayor -0.046* -0.080** -0.034 
 (0.024) (0.036) (0.047) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share Agric. Share Agric. Share Agric. 
Lega Nord Mayor 0.004 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share Industry Share Industry Share Industry 
Lega Nord Mayor -0.004 0.003 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share Trade Share Trade Share Trade 
Lega Nord Mayor 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 13816 7004 4558 
The table reports OLS estimates. Coefficients on Lega Nord Mayor from RD regression using pre-
determined characteristics as dependent variables. Column (1): Full sample; Column (2): IK bandwidth; 
Column (3): CCT bandwidth. The control variables are Margin of Victory, Margin of Victory*Lega Nord  









         
Table A5. The Effect of Electing a Lega Nord Mayor on Net Native Flow, Municipal Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lega Nord  Mayor 2.835 0.985 -0.012 1.272 3.434 
 (2.307) (2.951) (2.354) (4.155) (5.869) 
Polynomial Order MV NO Linear Quadratic Linear Linear 
Optimal Bandwidth NO NO NO IK CCT 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13852 13816 13816 7004 4558 
R-squared 0.318   0.318   0.318   0.360 0.382 
Mean dep. var. 15,115 15,115 15,115 15,210 16,772 
The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is Net Native Flow. Municipal characteristics are 
Population, Education, Income, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported 
in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. IK: Imbens, 


























Lega Nord Mayor   -0.676** -0.911* 0.077 0.383 -3.676 -4.473 
 (0.302) (0.491) (0.161) (0.267) (4.117) (5.306) 
Polynomial Order 
MV 
Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear 
Optimal Bandwidth NO CCT NO CCT NO CCT 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal 
characteristics 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 11973       3981 12213 4057 12320 4085 
R-squared 0.821 0.863 0.839 0.982 0.982 0.977 
Mean dep. var. 10.406% 11.207% 0.925% 0.733% 14.389 17.206 
The table reports OLS estimates. Municipal characteristics are Population, Education, Income, Area, Altitude, 
Urban, Share Agriculture, Share Industry, Share Trade. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipal level. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. CCT: Calonico, 
Cattaneo, Titiunik (2014). Total Expenditure in millions of euro. 
 
 
 
